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The Prospects for Providence¹

Introduction

What is the role of historical writing from a Christian perspective as we enter a new Christian millennium?

A moment of reflection on the Millennium celebration events which took place right across the globe supplies the thought that without the efforts of Christian chronologists many centuries ago there would not have been a millennium event to celebrate. It was these Christian chronologists who encapsulated a Christian understanding of time through a simple action which has affected perceptions of the past ever since.

The chronological scheme on which the millennium events relied was calculated by Dionysius Exiguus in 525. The precise mathematics of Dionysius' calculations are not the important issue: Jesus was actually born between 8 and 4 BC and the figures have been questioned ever since the Venerable Bede; what matters is the philosophical underpinning of Dionysius' chronology. Before 525 methods of dating had relied on a scheme which took the accession of the Emperor Diocletian in 284 as the baseline. Dionysius deliberately wanted to replace a scheme which began with Diocletian, the great persecutor, by one beginning with Jesus, the prince of peace. Dionysius' invention of the BC/AD convention implied that with the birth of Jesus history had been split into before and after. This in turn implied a shape to history, a direction and also a director. Even the contemporary division into 'Common Era' and 'Before the Common Era' begs a theological question: is it accident or not that this era can be termed common? What holds it together? These are the questions of providence that underlie '2000AD'.²

In this paper, I shall sketch an argument that history as an academic discipline requires a theological foundation. This foundation begs the providential question. Although ignored for many years, providence has not been rebutted as a theory, but rather by-passed; and developments in science and historical study suggest that the time is ripe to revisit it. This can only be done if theology and history recognise and respect the individual contributions of each other, and allow for 'signals of transcendence' within the flow of historical events. Finally, we consider the prospects for providence in the twenty first century.

1. History - the gift of the Hebrews

It is very hard for us to imagine a civilisation without a sense of history. Cicero said 'Not to know what took place before you were born is to remain forever a child.'³ This aphorism was quoted approvingly by Arthur Marwick in his influential textbook of 1970, *The Nature of History*; Marwick then went on to assert, 'The fundamental justification for historical study, then, is that history is necessary: it meets a basic instinct and need of men living in society.'⁴ Marwick wrote during what David Cannadine has called the 'golden age' of historiography in Britain.⁵ Yet now, only thirty years later, it would be hard to make such a sweeping statement that appealed to the 'necessary' status of history. Postmodernism as a philosophical movement challenges the very idea of representational time which Marwick could take for granted, and questions whether there need be any sense of time as a continuously flowing stream: rather it proposes an eternal present, with no use for the concept of history as we have known it. In other words, postmodernism allows for a civilisation that is 'post-historical' and does not have a sense of history.⁶

Despite Marwick's blithe assumption that a sense of history is a necessary part of civilisation, historical research (paradoxically) suggests the opposite. The ancient cultures of India and China are examples of sophisticated civilisations which existed largely without a historical sense, and which did not develop a historical literature to any significant degree.⁷ Recent advertisements on British TV remind viewers that the third Christian millennium is the sixth millennium of Egyptian civilisation. Indeed, ancient Egypt seems to have an increasing fascination in contemporary British society. Perhaps one of the reasons for this is that ancient Egypt managed to operate very successfully without a strong collective historical memory. Names and dates of rulers were preserved, but few records of events. The Egyptian climate is especially hospitable to the preservation of papyrus, and many different *genres* of writing have survived. But though there are official documents, moral tales, stories, myths and a large number of 'Wisdom texts', there is no 'history' as we would recognise it.⁸ The first genuine history of Egypt was written by Manetho around 300BC, but only at the instigation of Ptolemy II, one of Alexander's generals, who brought the Greek tradition of history-writing with him to his new realm.⁹ Ancient Egypt itself is therefore perhaps an example of an a-historical civilisation, showing that history is far from necessary.

Although the Egyptians kept a careful record of the names of kings and priests, they had no clear chronology to which to attach the names. Herodotus recorded the result of this state of affairs: the claim of the priests with whom he was in contact that their civilisation reached back 11 340 years.¹⁰ A crucial date for the reconstruction of Egyptian history is in fact derived from the Hebrew records which form the Old Testament: the invasion of Judah by Pharaoh Shishak in 925BC (1 Kings 14:25-6).¹¹ Only by cross-checking Egyptian records with Hebrew ones can a chronological framework for ancient Egypt be clearly established. This point brings us forcibly to the main contention of this section: that historical study as we know it was the gift of the Hebrews.

The ancient Near East spawned a number of civilisations which, in distinction from the Egyptian, did record the events of their past in a moderately systematic fashion. The fragmentary nature of archaeological discovery in that part of the world makes evidence difficult to find, but nevertheless it seems that some conception of the significance of the past was a common feature of Mesopotamian civilisation. In particular the Hittites seem to have been the first people to practise 'history' in anything approaching a modern sense.¹² Yet, as J.R.Porter says, ancient Near Eastern examples of history-writing form 'the raw materials of history, rather than history proper.'¹³ By contrast the Hebrews asserted a meaning and shape to history,¹⁴ and saw it not simply as a record of what had gone, but as part of a story which was not yet finished, but of which they already knew the ending. The key development for Hebrew historiography was thus an understanding of eschatology, the sense that the flow of events was a meaningful process which demonstrated the unfolding of a single divine plan, heading towards an end point.¹⁵ Yahweh's promise to form an eschatological people for himself gave a unity to Hebrew historiography which was lacking in the historical writings of other peoples. Monotheism made it possible for Hebrew historians to follow a single story-line which cut through the bewildering muddle of events. It is significant that Ernst Breisach judges that the decline of the *Polis* in ancient Greece caused history-writing there to lose its 'dynamic, unifying concept', and to become a means of illustrating 'simpler, more conventional lessons: that the cultivation of tradition, with its gods, rules, and values, was a good thing; that the gods were helping those who had self-discipline, exerted themselves, and brought sacrifices; and that loyalty was praiseworthy.'¹⁶ Greek historiography, lacking the sense of a common goal or ending, subsided into explaining episodes of history, but not the whole. Hebrew historiography, by contrast, was continued and developed in the Christian era because of its eschatological direction.

It follows that the removal of an understanding of God leads ultimately to the loss of eschatology and the sense of an ending or goal to the story which the historian tells. The removal of God from the picture begs the question, 'do we need history or historical enquiry?' If we truly are, as Nietzsche and Heidegger claimed and as postmodern philosophers have agreed,¹⁷ at the end of the metaphysical pattern of thinking mediated to us by the synthesis of biblical and classical culture that we call the 'Western Tradition', our culture may metamorphose into one that, like the Egyptian, is ancient but a-historical.

2. What happened to Christianity at the Enlightenment?

One of the most significant counter-arguments to the postmodern position is provided by George Steiner in his book *Real Presences*. Responding to the Nietzschean view that God is a 'vacant metaphor... a phantom of grammar' Steiner says that meaning and feeling, especially aesthetic meaning and feeling is 'underwritten by the assumption of God's presence.'¹⁸ Steiner does not claim that God's existence guarantees value in these fields; rather, he argues that the 'conjecture' that God is, what he calls the 'wager' on God and on transcendence is what spurs artists, poets and musicians to explore the world. Far from God being merely a wraith and 'phantom of grammar', 'grammar lives and generates worlds because there is the wager on God.'¹⁹ Such a view interestingly raises once more the question of eschatology; for a belief in eschatology is also a kind of wager: faith in this sense is trust that the story of history will come out as the ancient Hebrews and their Christian successors dreamed it might.

Steiner argues that the 'necessary possibility' of God is required for artistic endeavour. His thought echoes some of R.G.Collingwood's comments, reflecting on 'historical evidence' in the 1940s. Collingwood examined the philosophical principles which underlie inductive thinking and academic argument. He concluded that these principles require Christian theology to uphold them, for they 'have their roots in certain religious beliefs about nature and its creator God.'²⁰ Conceding that may seem paradoxical to some of his readers, Collingwood then asserted that the 'smoke-screen of propagandist literature' produced by the Enlightenment and during the 'conflict between religion and science' school in the nineteenth century obscured the fact that a 'scientific view of the world' is based on Christian theology 'and could not for a moment survive its destruction.' 'Take away Christian theology,' he wrote, and the historian has no motive for studying the past. In fact, 'If he goes on doing it at all, that is only because he is blindly following the conventions of the professional society to which he belongs.'²¹

The arguments of both Steiner and Collingwood, neither of whom would be called Christians in any conventional sense, suggest that the study of history is a theological act, whether one believes in the theology or not. For history to be a meaningful object of study, there must be at least the 'necessary possibility' that it forms a larger pattern and can be understood. Yet, as Collingwood implies, this is rarely understood, even more so today than it was sixty years ago, when Collingwood wrote the passage quoted. Why, then, we might ask, is the situation as it is? How did the great process of secularisation in Western culture take hold?

Wolfhart Pannenberg contends that to understand the situation we need to grasp that Christianity was never defeated as an intellectual system. The great medieval synthesis, revised and renewed by Calvin and the reformers (reformers on both sides of the papal fence) fell out of favour, in Pannenberg's view, because the church was unable to live up to it. A gospel of peace which was intellectually coherent fell on deaf ears when people saw the chaos brought about by the post-Reformation era of religious wars which ravaged mainland Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This period of conflict, in which the British Isles were only briefly

embroiled, led people to look elsewhere for the guarantee of value of which Steiner speaks. Pannenberg says:

The distinction between the religious and the secular changed again as a result of the sixteenth-century Reformation or, more precisely, as a result of the religious wars that followed the breakup of the medieval Church. When in a number of countries no religious party could successfully impose its faith upon the entire society, the unity of the social order had to be based on a foundation other than religion. Moreover, religious conflict had proved to be destructive of the social order. In the second half of the seventeenth century, therefore, thoughtful people decided that, if social peace was to be restored, religion and the controversies associated with religion would have to be bracketed. In that decision was the birth of modern secular culture. It would in time lead to *secularism* and a culture that is properly described as secularist.²²

Pannenberg's analysis has a ring of truth about it. Many textbooks include statements which imply that philosophy just 'moved on' from Christian theology to the Enlightenment. God was simply 'bracketed' out of the equation, but not removed. A good example of this is the issue of the miraculous, a *locus classicus* for the Enlightenment analysis of religion. David Hume claimed to judge biblical miracles on the same basis as any other historical event. However, his investigation was conducted not by weighing the evidence, but the application of *a priori* philosophical principles: 'A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.'²³ Later, Hume concluded 'That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish.'²⁴ In other words, Hume effectively ruled out any possibility of events which might be at odds with his own experience. For Hume, in A.N.Wilson's memorable image, 'God had become like a constitutional monarch of the Hanoverian dispensation: whether He had any influence or not, whether He was mad or not, whether He was there or not, did not make as much difference to the scheme of things as it would have if He were an absolutist Bourbon King.'²⁵ Human reason was sufficient to comprehend the world, and Christianity had been intellectually by-passed; supplanted but not defeated.

3. Revising the scientific world view – the impact of chaos theory

During the twentieth century, however, the idea of self-sufficient reason able to comprehend the world began to have break down. The Quantum revolution in physics and, very recently, the development of chaos theory, have combined to question the nineteenth-century ideal of scientific determinism. The implications of chaos theory are spelled out by John Polkinghorne. He writes that in a system such as the air in a room, which consists of many molecules colliding with each other, each molecule has approximately fifty collisions with its neighbours each. In a system of this complexity, to predict accurately the position of a molecule at the end of an observed period of one ten-thousand millionth of a second is immensely difficult, because in the course of the successive collisions of the molecules, even the slightest deflection will have an amplified effect the longer the period lasts. Polkinghorne's 'calculation of how these...molecules would be moving will be badly out if I have neglected to take into account the presence of an extra electron (the smallest particle of matter) on the other side of the observable universe (about as far away as you can get) interacting with the molecules through its gravitational force (the weakest of the intrinsic forces of nature).'²⁶ This example shows that complex systems are 'exquisitely sensitive and therefore intrinsically unpredictable'. Polkinghorne goes on to argue that it is reasonable 'to move from unpredictability (an epistemological statement) to openness (an ontological statement) – to say that the future is not simply a tautologous rearrangement of

what was already present in the past, but something really new.... Thus it seems to me that modern science tells us that we live in world whose ground rules do not specify all happenings completely. Instead they outline an envelope of future possibilities.²⁷ The significance of this view is that it emancipates scientific and historical thinking from the Humean strait-jacket of laws of nature. The world may be a place of new and unique happenings, as conditions combine in hitherto unknown and unexperienced ways. In Polkinghorne's view this also allows us to think again of God acting within the world, 'within the hiddenness of flexible process.'²⁸ The exciting news for historians is that it is with this world of infinite possibility that they must grapple.

4. Theology and History in alliance

In this world of infinite possibilities, historians are left somewhat uncomfortably aware of their ignorance. As Banquo says to Macbeth, who

can look into the seeds of time,

And say which grain will grow and which will not?

A purely descriptive approach to history fails to help us answer important questions, such as why one possibility emerged and another did not. Niall Ferguson's introduction to a stimulating collection of writing on counterfactual history picks up this point. Ferguson poses metaphysical questions which he is unable to answer:

The world is not divinely ordered, nor governed by Reason, the class struggle or any other deterministic 'law'. All we can say for sure is that it is condemned to increasing disorder by entropy. Historians who study its past must be doubly uncertain: because the artefacts they treat as evidence have often survived as a piece of historical evidence the historian immediately distorts its significance. The events they try to infer from these sources were originally 'stochastic' – in other words, apparently chaotic – because the behaviour of the material world is governed by non-linear as well as linear equations. The fact of human consciousness (which cannot be expressed in terms of equations) only adds to the impression of chaos. Under these circumstances, the search for universal laws of history is futile. The most historians can do is to make tentative statements about causation with reference to plausible counterfactuals, constructed on the basis of judgements about probability.²⁹

It is not clear why Ferguson believes that he can be *certain* that 'the world is not divinely ordered'. Especially in the light of Polkinghorne's exposition of chaos theory and its picture of a world of infinite possibility, the condemnation of the world to disorder through entropy seems also rather less sure than Ferguson makes out. If we were to work with Polkinghorne's view of a world of infinite possibility, then I believe the historian and theologian can usefully ally. We might wish to coin a version of 'Gödel's theorem' for historians. In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel proposed that 'systems of sufficient complexity to include whole numbers always contain propositions which are stateable but not decidable within that system.'³⁰ We might argue historical analysis similarly requires propositions which are stateable but not decidable within its own discipline.³¹ The existence of God and God's action in the world may not be concepts susceptible to historical proof, but they can be shown to be more likely than not and legitimately be borrowed from other disciplines and used within the study of history. Without theology history is blind: it cannot know where it is going; without history, theology is deaf and cannot hear the voices of the victims of the past.

Richard Fletcher's superb book *The Conversion of Europe* shows how, without some theological angle to explanation, history can be an unsatisfying meal. The crucial issue in Fletcher's narrative is, once again, the problem of miracle. In almost all the cases he mentions, Fletcher notes that it was the ability of Roman (or sometimes Irish) missionaries to demonstrate the power of God by miracles which led to conversion. Dark age spirituality was predicated on a fervent

belief in the miraculous activity of God. Fletcher's desire to avoid patronising the past³² means that he does not want to dismiss this matter out of hand. However, as a twentieth-century historian he also does not want to affirm the account as it stands. Thus he is actually unable to give much guidance about what really happened. Why were the missionaries so successful in their work that Christendom arose from the ashes of the Roman Empire? As one reviewer put it, 'The result is to leave a vacuum where there ought to be an explanation.'³³ The point of this example is that, within a book which is a shining example of contemporary historical writing, there is still a lacuna of explanation due to its failure to engage with the theological theme. Gordon Graham enters a plea for historians to attend to the specifically religious dimension of the past when he writes, 'In seeking to understand the character of ourselves as human beings we have to take account of the existence of religion.'³⁴ He asks that this 'taking account' is not, however, restricted to the purely phenomenological, as it is with Fletcher; rather, ideas of value and significance will draw upon 'the source or sources in which human beings have, albeit dimly, repeatedly and continuously thought that the greatest significance and value lie.'³⁵ Ultimately, Graham concludes, some form of providential history is the 'shape of the past' that makes most sense. This, in turn, must allow back in the question of miracle as a new and (possibly) unique occurrence in the kind of universe which Polkinghorne describes as one of radical openness.

5. Prospects for a providential model

The aim of this paper has been to sketch an argument in favour of history-writing underpinned by a providential understanding of the world. What might a providential model look like?

Once again, John Polkinghorne's work is very helpful here. He points out that if you had never seen water boil, its behaviour in a kettle at 100° C would appear wholly freakish and bizarre. For at that point the gradual and predictable rise in temperature of the water, which is directly related to the heat source applied to it, suddenly stops. Some of the liquid assumes a quite different state, and becomes the gas we call steam. When you make a cup of tea you expect this change and accept it as normal and wholly predictable. Yet what happens is that while the laws of physics remain the same, their consequences radically alter in the changed state beyond 100° C. Within the new regime, different events occur, which, if you didn't boil a kettle every day, you would not predict. So-called 'freaks of nature' may therefore simply be manifestations of what scientists term a 'phase change'. 'Miracles', normally treated also as freakish events, may fall into this category too, suggests Polkinghorne: they are a manifestation of a 'new regime'. He goes on to suggest that it is not at all strange, in the light of this scientific thinking, to consider that 'If it is true...that God was present in Christ in a way that he has not been present in any other person, then Jesus represented the presence of a new regime in the world. It is at least a coherent possibility that that new regime was accompanied by a new phenomenon.'³⁶ This 'new regime' surrounding Jesus is what the gospels call the kingdom of God. The gospels also describe opposition to Jesus' announcement of the kingdom of God. It is clear that he operates in an atmosphere of conflict. But this atmosphere is not 'just' a spiritual one: the opposition he faces has clear social and political manifestations, as much recent work on the historical Jesus has shown.³⁷ I would suggest that in these situations what we see is a three-way tension between God, human beings, and the opposition to the kingdom which usually has a concrete social and political reality. The autonomous role which this reality has corresponds to the language of the 'powers' which Paul frequently uses (e.g. Rom 8:38-9; 1 Cor 2:8, 15:24-6; Eph 1:19-21, 2:1-2, 6:12; Col 1:16, 2:15). These powers are not held to be intrinsically evil by Paul, but to have been created for good and turned to evil by the fallen nature of the world.³⁸ Although the precise way in which the 'powers' might correspond to political, economic and social factors requires a good deal of further attention, it is a helpful way in which to develop the understanding of God's action in the world. Divine action might be seen, therefore, as part of a three-way tension

between humans, the powers, and God. Where God is able to rule, there is the kingdom; but there are more factors involved than simply whether God wants to work. If a role is given to the 'powers' as concrete phenomena, then the role and importance of the cross in coming of the kingdom also comes more clearly into focus. Paul in Colossians 2:14b-15 speaks of how Jesus on the cross 'disarmed the rulers and authorities and made a public example of them, triumphing over them in it.' Here and elsewhere Paul sees the cross as the decisive battleground between the forces of good and evil, but there is an ambiguity in his treatment of the issue, for the cross is described as a definite victory over the powers in this passage, while in others (e.g. 1Cor 15:24-27a) their subjection lies in the future. In Walter Wink's exposition, Paul's doctrine of the defeat of the powers is seen to be an eschatological truth: the defeat of the powers was accomplished by Christ on the cross, but God's ultimate victory will not be shown beyond doubt until the end of time.³⁹

Obviously this New Testament-derived model needs considerable further exploration and exposition, which space precludes here. Nevertheless, it does give some indication of how a theology of history might help historians to study the past in all its reality, and suggest that the biblical material may have sufficient resources within it to be equal to the task. Against the postmodern assault, the study of history needs to recover its providential and eschatological roots in order to survive. There are deep philosophical themes here, and values and ideals which Arthur Marwick could take for granted in the early 1970s are now facing a severe questioning. Therefore I would conclude that the prospects for providence in the twenty-first century are important, and significant in the debate over the future of Western society.

¹ This is a revised version of a paper originally given at the SGCH Conference 'Christian Historical Writing in the Twenty First Century', Offa House 18-20 July 1999.

² See D.Ewing Duncan *The Calendar* (London 1998) pp.96-102, and T.Wright *The Myth of the Millennium* (London 1999) pp.4-7.

³ A.Marwick *The Nature of History* (London 1970) p.13.

⁴ *ibid.* p.14.

⁵ D.Cannadine 'British History, Past, Present – and Future?' *Past & Present* 116 (1987).

⁶ cf. G.Vattimo *The End of Modernity* (London 1988) pp.7-11, pp.103-7.

⁷ Cf. D.Boorstin *The Discoverers* (London 1984) pp.558-62. Marwick (*op.cit.* p.13) cites 'the great Chinese school of history' in favour of his own argument, but Boorstin notes that 'a modern historical consciousness did not develop in China' (p.560).

⁸ Cf. C.Walters 'Ancient Egypt' in A.Cotterell (ed.) *The Penguin Encyclopedia of Ancient Civilisations* (Harmondsworth 1988) pp.43-4.

⁹ Manetho's work survives only in narrative fragments quoted by Josephus.

¹⁰ Herodotus *Histories* II.142

¹¹ cf. K.Kitchen *The Third Intermediate Period* (Warminster 1973) p.72. The biblical Shishak is normally identified with Pharaoh Shoshenk, but there is doubt about this identification: cf. P.James, et.al. *Centuries of Darkness?* (London 1991) pp.229-31

¹² cf. H.Butterfield *The Origins of History* (London 1981) pp.60-71.

¹³ J.R.Porter 'Old Testament Historiography' in G.W.Anderson (ed.) *Tradition & Interpretation* (Oxford 1979) p.130.

¹⁴ Cf. Butterfield, *op.cit.* pp.80-84.

¹⁵ I am grateful to Professor Gerald Pillay of the University of Otago, New Zealand, for his helpful discussion of this point.

¹⁶ E.Breisach *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval & Modern* (Chicago 1983) p.22.

¹⁷ On Heidegger, see C.R.Bambach *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism* (New York 1995) pp.1-3; on postmodernist philosophy, see J-F.Lyotard *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Manchester 1984) p.xxiv.

¹⁸ G.Steiner *Real Presences: is there anything in what we say?* (London 1989) p.3.

¹⁹ *ibid.* p.4.

²⁰ R.G.Collingwood *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946) p.255.

²¹ *Ibid.*

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- ²² W.Pannenberg 'How to Think About Secularism' in *First Things* 64 (1996) p.29. His argument is advanced at greater length in *Christianity in a Secularized World* (London 1988).
- ²³ D.Hume *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748) Sect. X Pt 1.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ A.N.Wilson *God's Funeral* (London 1999) p.29.
- ²⁶ J.Polkinghorne 'God's Action in the World' *Center for Theology and Natural Sciences Bulletin* 10 (1990) available at www.starcourse.org/jcp/action.html
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁹ N.Ferguson 'Introduction' in N.Ferguson (ed.) *Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals* (London 1997) p.89.
- ³⁰ J.Polkinghorne *One World: the Interaction of Science and Theology* (London 1986) p.106. cf. J.D.Barrow *The World Within the World* (Oxford 1988) pp.254-60.
- ³¹ cf. G.G.Iggers *New Directions in European Historiography* (London 2/1985) pp.202-3 for a recognition that historical study is not autonomous and requires an 'ideological component' which may come from another field.
- ³² R.Fletcher *The Conversion of Europe: From Paganism to Christianity 371-1386AD* (London 1997) p.11.
- ³³ A.Palmer 'Winning the West', *Sunday Telegraph* Dec 21, 1997.
- ³⁴ G.Graham *The Shape of the Past: A Philosophical Approach to History* (Oxford 1997) p.221.
- ³⁵ Ibid. p.222.
- ³⁶ Polkinghorne, op.cit.
- ³⁷ See, for example, E.P.Sanders *The Historical Figure of Jesus* (London 1993) and N.T.Wright *Jesus and the Victory of God* (London 1996).
- ³⁸ Both H.Schlier *Principalities and Powers in the New Testament* (London 1961), and W.Wink *Naming the Powers: the Language of Power in the New Testament* (Philadelphia 1984) see the 'powers' as a significant part of Paul's worldview, but contend that the same is true for the whole of the New Testament. cf. especially Wink p.100.
- ³⁹ cf. W.Wink *Naming the Powers* p.115.